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The correctness of reasoning, logical models, and the faithfulness problem 
 
Mario Bacelar Valente1 
 
 
Abstract: When adopting a sound logical system, reasonings made within this system are correct. The 
situation with reasonings expressed, at least in part, with natural language is much more ambiguous. 
One way to be certain of the correctness of these reasonings is to provide a logical model of them. To 
conclude that a reasoning process is correct we need the logical model to be faithful to the reasoning. 
In this case, the reasoning inherits, so to speak, the correctness of the logical model. There is a weak 
link in this procedure, which I call the faithfulness problem: how do we decide that the logical model 
is faithful to the reasoning that it is supposed to model? That is an issue external to logic, and we do 
not have rigorous formal methods to make the decision.  The purpose of this paper is to expose the 
faithfulness problem (not to solve it). For that purpose, we will consider two examples, one from the 
geometrical reasoning in Euclid’s Elements and the other from a study on deductive reasoning in the 
psychology of reasoning. 
 
 
1 Logical model of Euclidean reasoning and the faithfulness problem 
 
How can we be certain that our reasoning is correct? In fact, what could we mean by the correctness 
of reasoning? In this first part, I will address these issues in relation to a very specific subject: the 
reasoning in the mathematical proofs in the planar geometry of Euclid’s Elements. For this work, I 
will only need to take into account one proof, that of proposition 1 of book 1 (proposition I.1). 
    Attaining certainty on the correctness of a reasoning process depends on how we define correctness. 
Here, I adopt a common view in which correctness is achieved by adopting a particular formal 
language and following its associated rules of inference. In this way, e.g., if we adopt propositional 
logic and adhere to its rules of inferences, the reasonings made with propositional logic will be correct 
(see, e.g., Hedman 2004, 12-9).   
    Now, in Euclid’s proofs one adopts a highly regimented language, but a natural language 
nonetheless (Netz 1999, 89-167). Also, there seems to be a fundamental component of what we might 
call diagrammatic reasoning related to diagrams (Avigad, Dean, and Mumma 2009). How can we 
determine the correctness of the reasonings? 
    As it is well-known, through history, doubts on the rigor of Euclidean proofs have been uttered 
(see, e.g., Venema 2012, 7-9). Here, I do not propose to address differences between the notions of 
rigor and correctness. One might even argue that even if we conclude that Euclidean proofs are not 
rigorous, they are nevertheless correct. For my purpose, it is enough to consider that doubts regarding 
the lack of rigor of Euclidean proofs can be further extended to the point of having doubts regarding 
the correctness of the proofs (or, at least, of lacking a rigorous way of showing the correctness of 
these unrigorous proofs). 
    If we could model the reasonings in Euclid’s proofs with formal logic, then we could conclude that 
the reasonings are correct. Avigad, Dean, and Mumma set forward a logical system they called E that, 
they claim, provides a faithful model of the proofs in Euclid’s Elements regarding planar geometry 
(Avigad, Dean, and Mumma 2009).  What do they understand by faithful, and what does it imply? A 
model in E is faithful to the Euclidean proof when it reproduces line-by-line the “argumentative 
structure” (i.e. the reasoning) of the proof.2 In particular, E mimics the inferences taken to be basic in 
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2 Here, I adopt Novaes' view that “a formal language […] can characterize directly the target phenomena without the 
mediation of ordinary languages” (Novaes 2012, 99). In this way, the idea of logic as translating natural language 
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speak of models of Euclidean proofs others of models of Euclidean reasonings. 
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the Elements (i.e. inferences made directly in one step without any further justification). In this way, 
when Euclid deploys an inference in just one step, so does E; in the same way, when Euclid needs a 
chain of steps to deploy an inference, so does E (Avigad, Dean, and Mumma 2009, 731). 
    There are relevant terminological differences between E and the regimented language of the 
Elements. That is taken not to impact on the faithfulness of E’s models of Euclidean proofs. One 
example is the meaning of the term line. With Euclid, the term line means line segment. In E, lines 
are, as usually defined in modern mathematics, non-bounded. This is seen as unproblematic since 
there is a “fairly straightforward translation between Euclid’s terminology and [E’s]” (Avigad, Dean, 
Mumma 2009, 732). Another example is that the language of E does not include the term triangle. 
This can be addressed by a definitional extension of E that enables the definition of triangle from the 
primitive terms of the language of E (Avigad, Dean, and Mumma 2009, 733). The view of the creators 
of E is that resorting to definitional extensions or other forms of “syntactic sugar” enables us to model 
more closely the Euclidean proofs (Avigad, Dean, and Mumma 2009, 734).  Accordingly, following 
the authors, a more precise formulation of the claim that a model in E is faithful to the corresponding 
Euclidean proof is: 
 
If we use a suitable textual representation of proofs [in E], then, modulo syntactic conventions like [the ones above], 
proofs in [the] formal system [E] look very much like the informal proofs found in the Elements. (Avigad, Dean, and 
Mumma 2009, 714) 
 
We will have to see in practice what “to look very much like” is taken to be. Let us first address the 
second part of the question above. Granted that the models of E are faithful to the Euclidean proof, 
what does this imply?  Avigad, Dean, and Mumma showed that the logical system E is sound and 
complete.  That has important consequences regarding the reasoning in Euclidean proofs. Taking into 
account the faithfulness of models of E, we may conclude that the proofs in the Elements are closer 
to formal proof texts than one might previously think (Avigad, Dean, and Mumma 2009, 760). From 
the perspective of the present work, the faithfulness of the models of E to the Euclidean proofs would 
make these “inherit” the rigor of E: the reasonings in the Elements (regarding planar geometry) would 
be sound in the precise sense that there are accurate models of these that are sound. By having a 
logical model faithful to the reasonings, we can argue that they are correct. We have a procedure to 
determine the correctness of Euclid’s reasonings. We can be sure that they are right. But are we sure 
that the models are faithful? To put it a bit differently: how do we know with certainty that the models 
are faithful? To address this question, let us look at E’s model of the proof of proposition I.1: 
 
Assume a and b are distinct points. 
Construct point c such that ab = bc and bc = ca. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proof. 
Let α be the circle with center a passing through b. 
Let β be the circle with center b passing through a. 
Let c be a point on the intersection of α and β. 
Have ab = ac [since they are radii of α]. 
Have ba = bc [since they are radii of β]. 
Hence ab = bc and bc = ca. 
Q.E.F. (Avigad, Dean, and Mumma 2009, 734) 
 
The terms “have” and “hence” are not part of the formal language, they are used to improve readability. 
In the same way, there are comments in brackets. Also, the drawn diagram is not part of E; it is 
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included to improve the readability of the proof.3   
    The first line of the proof is the second construction rule of lines and circles (Avigad, Dean, and 
Mumma 2009, 716). The construction rules establish the accepted constructions in E; applying one 
of them corresponds to constructing an object. Some preconditions must be satisfied for the 
construction to be possible; also, the construction rules construct objects with some specified 
properties. In the case of rule 2, it establishes the construction of circles. For that, as a prerequisite, 
we need two points that do not coincide. That is our case since it is assumed that points a and b are 
distinct. The properties established by rule 2 are: a is the center of α and b is on α. In this way, the 
first line constructs a circle α with center a and with b on α. In the second line, another circle is 
constructed: the circle β with center b and with a on β. In the third line, there are two rules at play: 
one inference rule and one construction rule. First, we infer a diagrammatic assertion based on the 
available diagrammatic information. We do this by applying a rule that enables us to draw a 
conclusion from the premises. It is the rule 5 of diagrams rules for intersections (Avigad, Dean, and 
Mumma 2009, 721). According to it, if a is on α, b is in α, a is in β, and b is on β, then α and β 
intersect. This rule is present implicitly on the third line since this line corresponds to rule 6 of the 
construction rules of intersections, in which the inferred conclusion of rule 5 – that α and β intersect 
– is a prerequisite of rule 6 (Avigad, Dean, and Mumma 2009, 717). The property of the constructed 
point c is that c is on α and c is on β. 
    On line four it is asserted that the segments ab and ac are equal. In E, “segment” means the length 
of a line between two points. The comment in brackets is intended to indicate how the assertion was 
inferred. One applies the diagram-segment transfer rule 3. According to this rule, if a is the center of 
α and b is on α, then ac = ab if and only if c is on α, which is the case. On line five, one applies the 
same inference to conclude that the segments ba and bc are equal. Finally, on line six, one applies 
two metrical inferences – the symmetry of line segments and the transitivity of equality – to conclude 
that the segments ab, bc, and ca are equal (Avigad, Dean, and Mumma 2009, 735). This concludes 
the proof in E. 
    A relevant aspect of Avigad, Dean, and Mumma’s approach relates to how faithfulness is 
determined. It is not. We take for granted that the model is faithful to the Euclidean original. The 
authors explicitly write the following: “Since the point of this exercise is to demonstrate that proofs 
in E are faithful to the text of the Elements, we recommend comparing our versions with Euclid’s.” 
(Avigad, Dean, and Mumma 2009, 734). That is, the faithfulness of the model is supposed to be self-
evident by just checking the Euclidean text in relation to the E’s model. So, let us do that. The 
Euclidean text is as follows: 
 
On a given finite straight line to construct an equilateral triangle. 
 
Let AB be the given finite straight line. 
Thus it is required to construct an equilateral triangle on the straight line AB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With center A and distance AB let the circle BCD be described; [Post. 3] 
again, with center B and distance BA let the circle ACE be described; [Post. 3] 
and from the point C, in which the circles cut one another, to the points A, B 
let the straight lines CA, CB be joined. [Post. I] 
Now, since the point A is the center of the circle CDB, AC is equal to AB. [Def. I5] 
Again, since the point B is the center of the circle CAE, BC is equal to BA. [Def. I5] 
 
3 According to the authors, “in E the diagram is nothing more than the collection of generally valid diagrammatic features 
that are guaranteed by the construction. In other words [...] we identify the diagram with the information provided by [a] 
construction […] and all the direct diagrammatic consequences of these data” (Avigad, Dean, and Mumma 2009, 706). 
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But CA was also proved equal to AB; therefore each of the straight lines CA, CB is equal to AB. 
And things which are equal to the same thing are also equal to one another; [C. N. I] 
therefore CA is also equal to CB. 
Therefore the three straight lines CA, AB, BC are equal to one another. 
Therefore the triangle ABC is equilateral; and it has been constructed on the given finite straight line AB. 
(Being) what it was required to do. (Heath 1956, 241-242) 
 
One can immediately notice that while in E we have the construction of a point c such that ab = bc, 
and bc = ca (where a and b are distinct points), in the Elements we have the construction of an 
equilateral triangle. This situation does not imply a lack of faithfulness on the part of the logical model. 
As mentioned, we can consider a definitional extension in which we define a triangle from primitive 
terms of E. Accordingly: 
 
Consider the [Euclidean] phrase “let abc be a triangle.” Assuming we take this to mean a nondegenerate triangle, we parse 
this as saying that a, b, and c are points, and there are lines L, M, and N, such that a and b are on L but c is not, b and c 
are on M but a is not, and c and a are on N but b is not. (Avigad, Dean, and Mumma 2009, 733) 
 
We could include a new line at the end of E’s model of the proof of proposition I.1, something like 
the following: 
 
abc is an equilateral triangle [by taking into account the definitional extension]. 
 
Apparently, there would be no lack of faithfulness due to the formulation of the model in terms of 
segments. But a closer look into the Euclidean reasoning shows that E’s model is not faithful after all. 
As it is, in my view, lines 4 and 5 of the model are not faithful to the Euclidean reasoning. I will only 
address line 4 since they are equivalent. Line four consists of: have ab = ac [since they are radii of 
α]. The Euclidean counterpart of this line is: since the point A is the center of the circle CDB, AC is 
equal to AB [Def. I5]. As we have seen, the reasoning underlying line four consists in applying the 
diagram-segment transfer rule 3 (if a is the center of α and b is on α, then ac = ab if and only if c is 
on α). To be more exact, it consists in applying what Avigad, Dean, and Mumma call a direct 
consequence of the rule (Avigad, Dean, and Mumma 2009, 725-7). We can formulate it somewhat as 
follows:  if a is the center of α, and b is on α, and c is on α, then ac = ab. From line 1, we have that a 
is the center of α, and b is on α by construction. From line 3, we have that c is on α. The diagram-
segment transfer rule 3 licenses us to infer that ac = ab. This reasoning, however, does not correspond 
to Euclid’s thinking. In this respect, the comment in brackets – [since they are radii of α] – is 
misleading since it does not agree with the reasoning made in E.   What is the corresponding reasoning 
in the Elements? Previous to conclude that AC is equal to AB, we draw the line segments CA and CB: 
let the straight lines CA, CB be joined. Then we resort to definition 15: a circle is a plane figure 
contained by one line such that all the straight lines falling upon it from one point among those lying 
within the figure are equal to one another (Heath 1956, 153). Definition 16 makes the previous one 
clearer: and the point is called the center of the circle (Heath 1956, 154). In the reasoning encapsulated 
in the proof, we have what we might call a component of diagrammatic reasoning. We draw two line 
segments connecting points C to A and C to B. We then see these line segments not merely a such but 
more specifically as radii of circle α. Taking into account the meaning of radii as given in definition 
15, we then infer that they are equal. We could model this reasoning informally as follows: 
 
Diagrammatic reasoning: seeing CA and CB as radii of α, and not just as line segments. 
Applying a sort of universal elimination rule:  All radii of a circle are equal 
       CA and CB radii of α 
       Then, CA = CB. 
 
To be more faithful to the Euclidean reasoning, in my view, the model should have more parts 
corresponding to the construction of the line passing through C and A and the line passing through C 
and B. We then would apply an inference rule enabling us to take the segments to be radii of α, and, 
afterward, we would make another inference to conclude that they are equal because they are radii of 
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the same circle (we would do the same for circle β). It could start by including something like the 
following: 
 
Let L1 be the line through c and a. 
Let L2 be the line through c and b. (construction rule 1 for lines and circles; Avigad, Dean, and Mumma 2009, 716) 
 
In E, segments are defined as the lengths of line segments from a point to another (Avigad, Dean, and 
Mumma 2009, 710). To include the above construction rule enables to approach in E the procedure 
adopted in the Euclidean proof. We would explicitly construct the lines passing by c and a, and c and 
b. Afterward, instead of ab = ac [by a direct consequence of the segment transfer rule 3], we would 
have something like the following: 
 
(definitional extension of radii in E). 
inference:  ab and ac are radii of circle α (here ab and ac are not just segments/lengths as defined in E but line segments 
as defined in the Elements). 
variant of transfer rule 3:  if ab and ac are radii of circle α, then ac = ab (here, in the conclusion ab and ac return to being 
“simply” segments as defined in E – the length of the line segments connecting points a and b and a and c). 
 
This would correspond to the application of a variant of the segment transfer rule 3 (if a is the center 
of α and b is on α, then ac = ab if and only if c is on α), in which we would make use of a definitional 
extension of radii of a circle. The new inference would correspond to the Euclidean practice of seeing 
an object in different ways (Macbeth 2010). In this case, we would model seeing ab and ac not merely 
as the segments we have just constructed connecting the points but as radii of the circle α. This “seeing 
an object in different ways” occurs throughout the Euclidean proof. After seeing line segments as 
radii and concluding that, because of this, they are equal, one returns to see them as “just” line 
segments and concludes by resort to common notion 1 that the line segments CA and CB are equal. 
From this one concludes that the line segments “CA, AB, BC are equal to one another” (Heath 1956, 
241). Until this moment, there is no mention of the notion of a triangle. However, immediately after 
this line of the proof one concludes: “Therefore the triangle ABC is equilateral” (Heath 1956, 242). 
For this to be the case, we reason in the diagram as Macbeth puts it (Macbeth 2010, 265): we actively 
go beyond seeing three line segments (proved to be metrically equal) as just line segments to see them 
as the sides of a triangle. Being metrically equal, we conclude that the triangle is equilateral. 
    One might argue that even if E’s model is not faithful in this part, there is no harm done. But we 
would need an argumentation that shows that this partial lack of faithfulness does not affect the 
inheritance of soundness on the part of the Euclidean proof from the model. This argumentation would 
be made outside logic; it would be informal. This would be another instance of the faithfulness 
problem: how do we show that the model is faithful enough to guaranty the soundness of the 
Euclidean reasoning? 
    Returning to my proposition of a more faithful model of the proof of proposition I.1, we are also 
stuck on the faithfulness problem: how can we decide with certainty that (a completed version of) 
this model is faithful? There seems to be no certainty in my claim of the faithfulness of the model. 
Without this certainty, there is no certainty on the soundness of the Euclidean reasoning also. My gut 
instinct is that the model is faithful, and because of this, we see that the Euclidean reasoning is sound. 
But gut instinct is not enough. 
 
 
2 Logical models of natural language deductive reasoning and the faithfulness problem 
 
We also face the faithfulness problem when addressing a more general human reasoning, not 
expressed in terms of a regimented language like that of the mathematical practice of the Elements. I 
will address the deductive reasoning; that is, the reasoning expressed with natural language in which 
the form of the argument guaranties that it is valid. One form of a valid argument is the modus ponens 
(Evans 2005). One example of this kind of argument is the following: If it is raining then the ground 
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is wet; it is raining; so, the ground is wet. Using a schematic formulation, the pattern of a modus 
ponens argument is as follows:  if the first, then the second; but the first; so, the second (Novaes 2012, 
72). 
    Here, I will consider a particular experimental study of deductive reasoning, the so-called Byrne’s 
suppression task (Byrne 1989); I will focus just on the part relating to modus ponens. The participants 
in the experiment were given a set of premises, and their task was to choose one of three proposed 
conclusions. They were told that the premises were true. The basic premises were: 
 
If she has an essay to write then she will study late in the library. 
She has an essay to write. 
 
There were three possible conclusions to choose from: 
 
(a) She will study late in the library. 
(b) She will not study late in the library. 
(c) She may or may not study late in the library. 
 
A group of participants was faced with the above premises. Of these, 96% of them choose the 
conclusion (a). This corresponds to a modus ponens argument. We can say that they adopted a pattern 
of a modus ponens argument according to the schematic formulation above. 
    A second group has to make their reasoning task considering also what Byrne calls an alternative 
antecedent – an antecedent that could elicit the same conclusion (Byrne 1989, 65): 
 
If she has an essay to write then she will study late in the library. 
If she has some textbooks to read then she will study late in the library. 
She has an essay to write. 
 
In this case, it was obtained the same percentage as with the first group. The presence of another 
premise did not affect the reasoning; it mainly – for 96% of the participants – corresponds to a modus 
ponens argument. 
    Finally, A third group was given the initial premises together with what Byrne calls an additional 
antecedent – an antecedent that “refers to some additional requirement that must also hold” (Byrne 
1989, 67): 
 
If she has an essay to write then she will study late in the library. 
If the library stays open then she will study late in the library. 
She has an essay to write. 
 
In this case, only 38% of the participants in this group arrive at the conclusion (a). From a (classic) 
logical point of view, like in the case of the so-called alternative premise, we should have something 
like: if p then q or if r then q; p; then q (p → q Ú r → q; p; then q). The additional premise should not 
affect the reasoning if this is made strictly by taking into account the logical form of the argument (as 
prescribed in classical logic). 
    According to Byrne, the additional premise leads to a suppression of the modus ponens argument: 
due to the context (the presence of an additional premise), the participants are rejecting instances of 
the valid modus ponens. 
    This result would imply that the mental inferences underlying human reasoning expressed with 
natural language, even in the case of deductive reasoning, do not comply with logical rules of 
inference. There would be no modus ponens inferences underlying what we might expect to be modus 
ponens arguments. That is so because, in many cases, where we should have a modus ponens 
argument we face a modus ponens suppression, and we have a different conclusion. Byrne takes her 
result as indicating that we do not reason with a mental logic (Byrne 1989). In simple terms, mental 
logic corresponds to the idea that we reason according to logical rules. One example is modus ponens; 
we would have a logical inference rule system in our minds, literally, and there would exist a modus 
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ponens inference (Manktelow 2012, 43-6). 
    Byrne’s conclusion was challenged by Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004b). Previous to address 
their approach, it is important to clarify from the start that Stenning and van Lambalgen do not 
propose some sort of mental logic. To the best of my knowledge, this aspect of their approach is made 
clearer in a book by Novaes: 
 
Stenning and van Lambalgen offer extensive modelling of human reasoning in terms of this framework, but I take it that 
they do not mean to claim that the very syntactical rules described by the framework are actually and precisely 
implemented when people reason. Instead, as I read them, the formalism is presented as a model of the phenomena in 
question, just as a physical theory is a model of physical reality: an approximate description, not the ‘real thing’. (Novaes 
2012, 142) 
 
In personal communication, Stenning clarifies that they take at least some aspects of the formalism to be accurate 
representations of psychological phenomena. For example, the formalism does presuppose an asymmetry between 
positive and negative information, and there are reasons to think that this asymmetry is a real psychological phenomenon 
(e.g., the discrepancy in reasoning competence with modus ponens v. modus tollens, which is naturally accounted for in 
terms of such an asymmetry). (Novaes 2012, 142) 
 
I will address Stenning and van Lambalgen`s approach in a way equivalent to the logical system E – 
as providing a logical model, in this case, of a reasoning task. There is an important difference 
between E and the logical system proposed by Stenning and van Lambalgen. In the first case, we 
always have the same logical system E that is applied to all the Euclidean reasonings under 
consideration. In the case of Stenning and van Lambalgen, we have a more general logical framework 
that is made more specific for each participant: we model each participant’s interpretation of the 
reasoning task with a particular variant of the logical system. Initially, we model with a variant of the 
logical model each participant’s reasoning to a particular interpretation of the premises. Only 
afterward do we have the modeling of the inferences of the participant using the specific variant of 
the logical system.  We can refer to these two steps as reasoning to an interpretation or model of the 
premises, and reasoning from this fixed interpretation or model (Varga, Stenning, and Martignon 
2015; Stenning and van Lambalgen 2004b). 
    That leads to a completely different view on the results of the suppression task. In Byrne’s case, 
we face a modus ponens suppression, conceived as a failure to apply classical logic and leading to a 
non-sound reasoning. We can now conceive this as the adoption by the participant of a reasoning 
pattern that is sound according to the variant of the logical system – the specific logical model – that 
we take to be faithful to the participant’s reasoning. 
    The main characteristic of the general logical framework adopted by Stenning and van Lambalgen 
is how a conditional “if p then q” is represented. It has the form p Ù ¬ab → q, which we can read as 
“if p and nothing is abnormal, then q”; ab stands for an abnormality that would lead to an exception:  
in the case of an abnormality we cannot infer q from p, it blocks the inference. One takes the 
conditional formulas to have conjoined abnormality conditions with the form r1 → ab1, …, rn → abn. 
When there is evidence of some ri then we take there to be the case that we have the abnormality abi. 
This is an important aspect of this logical framework, which corresponds to the adoption of the closed 
world assumption: if there is no positive evidence for a proposition, we can conclude that it is false; 
concerning an abnormality ab, this means that if there is no positive evidence for ab then we conclude 
that ¬ab is true. In this case the logical form of the conditional reduces to p → q (Stenning and 
Lambalgen 2010, 6; Stenning and Lambalgen 2008, 184; Besold et al. 2017, 45-6). 
    Let us see Stenning and van Lambalgen’s approach at work in the case of Byrne’s suppression task. 
The conditional “If she has an essay to write then she will study late in the library” is represented by 
the formula p Ù ¬ab → q. Both the conditionals “if the library stays open then she will study late in 
the library” and “if she has some textbooks to read then she will study late in the library” are 
represented by a formula of the form r Ù ¬ab´ → q. 
    In this case, modeling a participant’s reasoning to an interpretation of the premises is made by 
adjusting the meaning of the abnormalities in the previous general formulas. That leads to taking into 
account, if that is the case, some abnormality conditions. Afterward, it is modeled the reasoning from 
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the resulting fixed model. 
    A model consistent with a modus ponens argument in the first group has, simplifying, the clauses 
{p; p Ù ¬ab → q}. There is no information leading to consider that we have an abnormality. That 
implies that we have {p; p → q}. In this case, the setting of the model is finalized by replacing → by 
the classical biconditional ↔ (Besold et al. 2017, 47). The end result of this modeling of the 
participant’s reasoning to an interpretation is {p; p ↔ q}. The reasoning from this interpretation starts 
from the logical form p ↔ q and the premise p, and derives q (Stenning and Lambalgen 2008, 197). 
    Let us now see a model consistent with the suppression of the modus ponens argument by a 
majority of the third group’s participants. Besides the conditional clause of the first premise p Ù ¬ab 
→ q (p = “she has an essay to write”, q = “she will study late in the library”), we also have a clause 
representing the additional premise:  r Ù ¬ab´ → q, where r = “the library stays open”. Also, the 
additional premise makes salient the possibility of an abnormality represented in the model by the 
abnormality condition ¬r → ab (Stenning and Lambalgen 2019, 7-8; Stenning and Lambalgen 2008, 
198).  
    The reasoning to an interpretation starts with a set that contains p, p Ù ¬ab → q, r Ù ¬ab´ → q, 
and ¬r → ab. This reduces to {p; (p Ù r) ↔ q}.  To be able to infer q from (p Ù r) ↔ q (“if she has 
an essay to write and the library stays open then she will study late in the library”) we would need to 
have as a premise, besides p (“she has an essay to write”), also r (“the library stays open”). According 
to Stenning and van Lambalgen, “the reasoning from an interpretation is now stuck in the absence of 
information about r” (Stenning and Lambalgen 2008, 198).   
    This situation does not occur with the second group. In this case, as we have seen, the alternative 
conditional (“if she has some textbooks to read then she will study late in the library”) is also 
formalized as r Ù ¬ab´ → q. According to Stenning and van Lambalgen, “by general knowledge, the 
alternatives do not highlight possible obstacles” (Stenning and Lambalgen 2008, 199). As they 
mention elsewhere, “[the] integration of the third premise does not lead to the addition of information 
on ab or ab´” (Stenning and Lambalgen 2004a, 20-1). In this way, there are no possible abnormalities, 
and the reasoning to an interpretation fixes the model {p; p Ú r ↔ q}. Reasoning from this 
interpretation/model derives q (Stenning and Lambalgen 2008, 199).     
    From what we have just seen, it is evident that the general framework proposed by Stenning and 
van Lambalgen is flexible enough to provide models of reasoning compatible with the results in the 
suppression task with the three groups. But do these models correspond in any way to the actual 
reasonings of the participants? As it is, this could be an ad hoc way of fitting to the experimental 
results (the choice of the conclusion by each participant). What is at stake is the faithfulness of the 
models to the actual reasonings. 
    As Stenning and van Lambalgen mention, regarding another reasoning task, one needs a controlled 
experiment to provide evidence that the reasoning does take place as modeled (Stenning and 
Lambalgen 2008, 59). For that purpose, after each participant realizes the reasoning task, they ask 
him or her for a justification of the chosen conclusion (Stenning and Lambalgen 2004b, 40). This 
unfolds in the form of a dialogue that is supposed to bring some light on the participant’s reasoning 
when making his or her choice. Let us consider two excerpts of dialogues. The first is taken as 
evidence for the modeling of the suppression of modus ponens: 
 
Subject 2. 
S: Ok yeah I think it is likely that she stays late in the library tonight, but it depends if the library is open. . . so perhaps I 
think [pauses]. yeah, in a way I think hmm what does it say to me? I mean the fact that you first say that she has an essay 
to write then she stays late in the library, but then you add to it if the library stays open she stays late in the library so 
perhaps she’s not actually in the library tonight, because the library’s not open. I don’t think it’s a very good way of putting 
it. 
E: How would you put it? 
S: I would say, if Marian has an essay to write, and the library stays open late, then she does stay late in the library. 
(Stenning and Lambalgen 2008, 204) 
 
According to Stenning and van Lambalgen, this answer is accounted straightforwardly by the logical 
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model. The conditional has the form (p Ù r) → q. In this way, the modus ponens is suppressed unless 
it is included the premise r (“the library stays open late”) which together with p (“Marian has an essay 
to write”) licenses the inference that q (“she does stay late in the library”) (Stenning and Lambalgen 
2008, 204). 
    Stenning and van Lambalgen give the following excerpt as an example of evidence for the adoption 
of the closed world assumption: 
 
Subject 7. 
S: . . . that she has to write an essay. because she stays till late in the library when she has 
to write an essay, and today she stays till late in the library. 
E: Could there be other reasons for her to stay late in the library? 
S: That could be possible, for example, maybe she reads a very long book. But as I 
understand it she stays late in the library only if she has to write an essay. (Stenning and Lambalgen 2008, 205) 
 
In Stenning and van Lambalgen’s interpretation of the dialogue, “the italicized phrase seems to point 
to closed-world reasoning” (Stenning and Lambalgen 2008, 205). 
    Stenning and van Lambalgen consider that seven out of ten participants behave according to the 
logical model (Stenning and Lambalgen 2008, 212); however, they are aware of the limitations of 
using dialogues. Accordingly: 
 
We do not interpret these dialogues as reports of reasoning that went on before the dialogue, let alone as transparent and 
complete reflections of such preceding thought processes. These dialogues are the subjects’ reasoning with a tutor during 
a dialogue. Engaging subjects in dialogue undoubtedly changes their thoughts, and may even invoke learning. The relation 
between the reasoning processes evoked by the standard way of conducting the task, and the processes reflected in 
subsequent dialogues is a relation that remains to be clarified. (Stenning and Lambalgen 2001, 280) 
 
Elsewhere they also remark the following: 
 
We acknowledge that we cannot be certain that our interpretations of the dialogues are correct representations of mental 
processes – the reader will often have alternative suggestions. (Stenning and Lambalgen 2008, 59) 
 
We face two layers of the faithfulness problem with logical models of reasoning tasks. In the case of 
the logical model of Euclidean reasoning we had only one: we cannot be certain that the model is 
faithful to the reasoning as expressed in the proof. The situation here is more complex. Here, we also 
face the issue of the participant’s reconstruction of his or her reasoning. As Stenning and van 
Lambalgen rightly point to, it is unclear what is the actual relation between the participant’s 
reconstruction expressed in the dialogue and the earlier reasoning. We do not have this problem in 
the modeling of Euclidean reasoning. What we call Euclidean reasoning is expressed in the proof. We 
are modeling the proofs while taking them to express an underlying reasoning process. It is here that 
we face the faithfulness problem: how can we be sure that our model is faithful to the Euclidean proof 
(as practiced by Euclid)?  With logical models of reasoning tasks, we also have this layer of the 
faithfulness problem. Stenning and van Lambalgen acknowledge that they cannot be certain of their 
interpretation of the dialogues. That is, even if we took for granted that a dialogue expresses the actual 
reasoning of a participant, we cannot be sure that we are making the correct interpretation of the 
dialogue. In this way, in the logical modeling of a reasoning task the faithfulness problem is two-fold: 
(1) we are not certain that the dialogues express the reasonings of the participants; (2) we are not 
certain of making the correct interpretations of the dialogues (someone else will often have different 
interpretations). Without this, we only have logical models that are compatible with the choices of 
conclusions made by the participants.  
    By construction, the natural language conditionals arising from the interpretation of the dialogues, 
adopted by Stenning and van Lambalgen, are faithful to the models. For example, in the case of 
suppression, Stenning and van Lambalgen propose the logical model (p Ù r) → q; this corresponds in 
a dialogue to the participant’s phrase “if Marian has an essay to write, and the library stays open late, 
then she does stay late in the library”. Stenning and van Lambalgen take this phrase to be accounted 
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straightforwardly by the logical conditional, so we can consider this phrase as a natural language 
conditional with which the participant expresses his or her reasoning. My gut instinct is that Stenning 
and van Lambalgen are right in the case of this particular participant (at least regarding the 
interpretation of the dialogue). However, in general, we are not certain that we are making a rigorous 
interpretation of the dialogue concerning the participant’s reconstruction of his or her reasoning (since 
we have no formal method to attest this). Neither are we certain that the dialogue corresponds in any 
clear way to the reasoning of the participant.   
 
 
 
3 Conclusions 
 
Logic provides a powerful formalism to address the correctness of reasonings. Within logic itself, the 
soundness of inferences is not subjected to doubt, in the sense that for every logical system we have 
a collection of sound rules of inference. Outside logic, if we try to address the correctness of 
reasonings expressed with natural language, we face enormous difficulties due to the lack of a formal 
approach to address it. One way to deal with this difficulty is to envisage logical models of the 
reasoning under study. If we can find logical models of the reasoning, then we might say that the 
reasoning is correct or sound in the sense of having a sound logical model. But for this to be the case 
we need actually to have a logical model of the reasoning. That is, the model must be faithful to the 
reasoning that it models. In this work I consider two examples of reasonings, the Euclidean reasoning 
in the proofs on planar geometry in the Elements, and the reasoning in Byrne’s suppression task. In 
the case of the Euclidean reasoning, a logical model has been proposed by Avigad, Dean, and Mumma. 
In the case of the reasoning task, a logical model has been proposed by Stenning and van Lambalgen. 
The purpose of the present work was to call the attention to what I have called the faithfulness problem, 
by using these two logical models as examples. We have no way to decide with certainty that these 
logical models are faithful to the reasoning they are supposed to be modeling. This implies that we 
cannot use the existence of these models to decide with certainty that the reasonings are correct. 
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